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Semiotics, Epistemology, and Inquiry
Jeanette Bopry
In this paper I take a look at what semiotics has to offer inquirers. I look at its
implications for epistemology and method, especially in light of its support for
multiple realities. Inquirers will find it provides a framework in which they can find a
place for any method that does not objectify the sign process and in which they as
authors of inquiry will be made visible to readers of that inquiry.

The past two or three decades have seen
significant discussion concerning changing
paradigms in inquiry. Because of the closed
nature of opposing paradigms the debate can
become difficult to follow. This is because
the assumptions made by the promoters of
opposing paradigms may be so different as to
make their arguments incomprehensible to
one another. Promoters of an alternative
paradigmatic position cannot afford to be
held hostage to the terminology of the
established paradigm since this terminology
is steeped in the assumptions of the
established paradigm. Attempts to do so
(e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1985) have resulted
in the impression that a viable alternative
paradigm is not being proposed at all,
instead, merely a rejection of or a reaction to
the established one. Using the terminology
of the established paradigm, then, can
hamper attempts to justify the establishment
of an alternative paradigm for its own
positive reasons. If proponents of opposing
paradigms cannot use one another's
language, is there some language that can
cross paradigmatic boundaries? I suggest
that semiotics can provide that common
language. If one accepts Peirce's (CPS.
endnotes) contention that the universe is
perfused with signs, then signs provide a
common denominator that can become a
bridge of communication between fields of
endeavor. If the sign is the essential matter of
the universe, then semiotics encompasses all
forms of inquiry; it does not espouse
particular methodologies. Indeed, Deely

( 1990) argues that semiotics represents a
truly radical, nonideological paradigm shift
that can provide a foundation upon which a
number of methods will flourish.
What is Semiotics?
Semiotics is the study of sign action
(semiosis). As such, it is a purely human
endeavor. All life forms engage in semiosis,
all use signs, only humans know they exist.
Only humans engage in inquiry into
serniosis, or sign activity. As Deely (1990)
observes, "at the heart of semiotics is the
realization that the whole of human experience, without exception, is an interpretive
structure mediated and sustained by signs"
(p. 5).

A sign is anything that stands for
something else. David Sless (1986) argues
that the "stand-for" relationship is the lowest
common denominator in human experience.
Reduction beyond this point is impossible.
Semiotics, or the study of semiosis, is
concerned with the ways we represent our
world to ourselves and to others. It requires
that we reflect on our ways of understanding
and communicating. It is also a way of
finding commonalities between disciplines.
If we want to know what art history has in
common with anthropology, for example, we
might consult a semiotician. Semiotics is
above all else a point of view, a way of
looking at the world (Deely, 1990).
When I talk about semiotics, I am
speaking of the tradition that Deely attributes
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to Poinsot-Locke-Peirce, and not to the
tradition attributed to Saussure. Unlike
Saussure's semiology, which takes its
principal inspiration from human language
and speech, semiotics is broader and more
fundamental, involving the physical realm
and the biosphere as well as the Lebenswelt
(i.e., experience specific to the human
species; Deely, 2001). All life forms engage
in semiosis, which Sebeok (1991) refers to as
a criteria[ attribute of life. Only a small
percentage of semiosis takes place in the
Lebenswelt. In fact, most semiosis is
chemical (Sebeok, 1991). This makes
Saussure's semiology a subdivision of
semiotics, the study of that type of semiosis
that is species-specifically human.
A sign is not that which it represents; it
only resembles, refers to, or is somehow
associated with that which it represents. In
addition, a sign is indifferent to the actual
existence of what it represents. This is what
makes deception and lying possible. Hence,
Eco (1979) says a sign is anything that can
be used to tell a lie. This need to lie may be
at the very foundation of the creation of
language. "The single most striking feature
of human language [is] its power to convey
the nonexistent with a facility every bit equal
to its power to convey thought about what is
existent" (Deely, 1990, p. 17). This peculiar
characteristic of a sign also makes
mythology and fear of the nonexistent
possible. Hence, uncertainty is a built-in
characteristic of sign activity.

these three basic classes. The basic classes
are identified with the concepts firstness,
secondness, and thirdness.
Firstness is the mode of being that is
what it is without reference to anything else
(Peirce, 1958)-it is associated with qualities: color, texture, shape, etc. This is similar
to what Phillips ( 1990) refers to as a lowinference
variable,
something
whose
characteristics are generally universally
agreed upon. Qualities normally have an
iconic relationship with their objects (there is
a resemblance).
Secondness is a mode of being that is
what it is in respect to a second, but
regardless of any third-it is associated with
effort and opposition (Peirce, 1958).
Secondness comes in the recognition of "the
other." It is the recognition that there is self
and not self, it comes into play in the
separation of field and ground, it is
opposition. Opposition is the state of brute
existence, 1 one thing acting upon another
normally has an indexical relationship with
its object. An index represents its object
because it is affected by that object in the
way that smoke represents fire, or as tracks
in the woods represent a deer (there is a
causal relationship).
Thirdness is the mode of being that is
what it is, bringing a second and third into
relation with each other (Peirce, 1958).
It seems a strange thing, when one
comes to ponder over it, that a sign
should leave its interpreter to supply a
part of its meaning; but the explanation
of the phenomenon lies in the fact that
the entire universe-not merely the
universe of existents, but all the wider
universe, embracing the universe of
existents as a part, the universe which
we are all accustomed to refer to as "the
truth"-that all this universe is perfused

Divisions of Signs
The number three is very important in
semiotics. A fundamental difference between
semiotics and most other points of view
(including semiology) is that it organizes
itself into trichotomies rather than
dichotomies. So, for example, there are
basically three ways a sign can stand for its
object: as an icon, as an index, or as a
symbol. Peirce subdivides signs into further
classifications, but I intend to deal only with

l.

Note that this suggests that firstness is preexistence. One can say that firstness is possibility.
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with signs, if it is not composed
exclusively of signs. (CP5.448n)
The sign mediates between an object and the
interpretant through law or reason (CP2.31 l ,
CP8.343). A symbol is an example of this
form of thirdness, its association with its
object is arbitrary, a social convention
perhaps. Words are examples of symbols.
Signs themselves have all three
aspects-an iconic, an indexical, and a
symbolic component. As sign users all
animals engage in interpretation, which
involves thirdness, albeit a degenerate form .
Deception, for example, is common in
nature. The interpretive aspect of a sign may
emphasize any one aspect of the sign such
that a sign may be considered primarily an
icon, primarily an index, or primarily a
symbol. So, the association of the concept
deer or food with tracks in the wood by some
third party is symbolic even though the
relationship of the deer to the tracks is
indexical. Yet, one may consider the
indexical aspect of the sign the important
relationship if one is tracking the animal.
Our own discussion of the tracker may focus
on the interpretation itself and emphasize the
aspect of thirdness: the word deer or the
image of the animal created in the mind.
So the application of these three
concepts is relative to the context that the
observer establishes; they are context dependent. This is also true when one considers
representamens, or things that represent
themselves. Anything that represents itself
rather than something else is, by definition,
not a sign. At one level a specific dog can be
said to represent that specific dog, or
represent itself. However, our knowledge of
that dog is itself a compilation of sensory
perceptions, smells, sights, textures, that
stand for that dog. In the first case, the
interpreter, the observer has arranged the
sensory input into an entity 2 and it is this
arrangement rather than its parts that comes
to stand for the organism itself. In the
second, the thing (dog) as a sign becomes an

index that represents the combined sensory
information that brought it about. It is in this
way that one can understand that some
semioticians conclude that all things are
signs and others conclude that in some cases
representamens (non-signs) exist. While the
environment is perfused with signs, we do
not treat everything as a sign at any one point
in time.
Semiosis provides the living being a way
of approaching a very complex process in a
way that makes creations of models of reality
possible. Semiotics provides the human
being a way to make these models visible
and thereby available to study, scrutiny, and
criticism. According to Sebeok (1991):
In this view, semiotics is not about the
"real" world at all, but about complementary or alternative actual models of
it and-as Leibniz thought-about an
infinite number of anthropologically
conceivable possible worlds. Thus
semiotics never reveals what the world
is, but circumscribes what we can know
about it; in other words what a semiotic
model depicts is not "reality" as such,
but nature as unveiled by our method of
questioning. It is the interplay between
"the book of nature" and its human
decipherer that is at issue. (p. 12)
When we engage in inquiry we are looking
for coherences within our own experience
relating to the object of our study, not for
coherences within the experience of the
object (Maturana, 2002). All inquiry is
filtered through our own experience. There is
no way to understand a thing as it is in itself,
only as it is within human experience. In
other words, human understanding is part of
the Lebenswelt regardless the subject of that
understanding.

2.

See T. von Uexktill (1987) for a description
of how sensory input is projected into the
environment.

Volume 17, Number 1 (Fall 2002)

8

Semiotics, Epistemology, and Inquiry

Epistemology
What is the relationship of the knower to
the known? Problems of epistemology have
been around since the earliest days of
philosophy. Historically, there have been
basically two choices: some form of realism
or some form of idealism. They represent an
argument between promoters of sides of a
mutually exclusive dichotomy. Unfortunately, neither position can account for
what we know about ourselves and the world
we live in. Realism cannot account for
cognitive processes that are such an intimate
and familiar part of each of our lives and
idealism cannot account for the ability of
living entities to interact effectively with the
outside world. The problem inherent in this
dichotomy is well summarized in the work
of Maturana and Varela ( 1987), who use the
terms representationalism (realism) and
solipsism (idealism):
In fact, on the one hand there is the trap
of assuming that the nervous system
operates with representations of the
world. And it is a trap, because it blinds
us to the possibility of realizing how the
nervous system functions from moment
to moment as a definite system with
operational closure ... On the other hand,
there is the other trap: denying the
surrounding
environment
on
the
assumption that the nervous system functions completely in a vacuum, where
everything is valid and everything is
possible. This is the other extreme:
absolute cognitive solitude or solipsism,
the classic philosophic tradition which
held that only one's interior life exists.
And it is a trap because it does not allow
us to explain how there is a due
proportion or commensurability between the operation of the organism and
its world. (p. 133)

Realism falls noticeably short when one
considers the results of scientific experi-

mentation that demonstrate the nervous
system does not operate like an open system,
with inputs and outputs, processing
information from the outside and producing
appropriate behavior. Rather, it operates like
an operationally closed system that is
constantly in search of equilibrium. Its
structure (component parts, what it's made
ot) determines what changes in the
environment will perturb it and how it will
change in order to maintain that equilibrium
(see Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1987).
Maintaining equilibrium results in conserving both organization (identity as a particular
type of entity: a frog; a cat; a human being)
and adaptation to the environment in which
the entity lives. None of this requires the
computation of a map of the outside world to
happen. 3 It can be explained by the history of
interactions where the species in question
and the environment have mutually come
into being, each undergoing change because
of the presence of the other, but only
undergoing change that is determined by
their own structures.
According to Sebeok (1991), the
"distinction between object (0) and sign (S)
raises profound questions about the anatomy
of reality, indeed about its very existence" (p.
12). He claims that there are two
possibilities:
In the age-old philosophical quest for
reality, two alternative points of
departure have been suggested: that the
structure of being is reflected in semiotic
structures, which thus constitute models,
or maps, of reality; or that the reverse is
the case, namely that semiotic structures
3.

This argument is from Maturana and Varela
( 1987). It is supported by J.W. Sperry's
experimentation on the visual field of . the
frog which shows close coordination between the frog's visual field and its behavior
and none between the actual spatial relationship of predator and prey, as determined by
an observer, and the frog's behavior.
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are independent variables so that reality
becomes the dependent variable.
Although both views are beset by many
difficulties, a version of the second, proposed by the remarkably seminal German biologist Jakob van Uexkiill (18641944), under the watchword UmweltForschung-approximately translated as
"research in subjective universes" -has
proved to be in best conformity with
modem semiotics (as well as with
ethology). (1991, p. 12)
From the perspective of semiotics,
idealism has an advantage over realism
because it at least recognizes "that when we
observe anything, that observation already
presupposes and rests within a semiosis
whereby the object observed came to exist as
an object ... in the first place" (Deely, 1990,
p. 5). So, given a forced choice the semiotician would probably select the route of
idealism. Having expressed a preference for
idealism Deely (1990) declares that
semioticians must move beyond it. His
reason is that idealism is limited to language
and as such cannot go all the places semiosis
can: zoosemiosis, phytosemiosis, and
physiosemiosis. Deely (1990) calls the
idealist/realist problem a false dichotomy
and, like Maturana and Varela, Deely insists
that the appropriate way to deal with this age
old dichotomy is to supersede it. The reader
must already suspect the problem that a
semiotician has with dichotomies: they are
inherently incomplete. A central characteristic of Peirce's semiotic is its organization
into trichotomies. In their extreme forms
both idealism and realism can account for
only two parts of a semiotic trichotomy. In
the case of realism the physical world
imposes itself upon the living organism to
make it adapt. In the case of idealism the
cognitive processes create the physical
world. Both are examples of secondness,
brute force, mere opposition; neither allows
for interpretation. In the first instance this is
because there is no internally directed

cognition or structural determination; in the
second because everything conceived of
exists. Both these positions stand in marked
contrast with experience common to us all.
We each have a rich inner life and we all
have the experience of conceiving of things
that do not exist, from unicorns and
minotaurs to the shortcut that was going to
save twenty minutes of travel time. Deely
(1990) suggests the following trichotomy:
what is unknown about the psychological
world, what is unknown about the physical
world, and what is known. This trichotomy is
consistent with Deely's adaptation of
Uexkiill's (1982) theory to semiotics.
Deely (1990) believes that Uexkiill has
provided the semiotician with an essential
tool for understanding semiosis that is not
human. The way that Uexkiill deals with the
problem of epistemology is to alter the
location of reality. In his Umwelt theory,
reality is not to be found in the outside world
or in the mind of the observer:
Reality, to which all is subjected and
from which everything is deduced, is not
to be found "outside," in infinite space,
which has neither beginning nor end,
and which is filled with a nebulous cloud
of elementary particles; nor is it to be
found "inside," within ourselves and the
indistinct, distorted images of this
external world created by our mind.
Reality manifests itself in those worlds
-described by Uexkiill as Umwelten
(subjective-self-worlds) with which
sense perception surrounds all living
beings like a bubble-clearly delineated
but invisible to outside observers . ... This
ultimate reality ... reveals itself through
signs. These signs are therefore the only
true reality; and the rules and laws under
which the signs and sign processes
communicate themselves to our mind
(Gemut) are the only true laws of nature.
(T. van Uexkiill, 1987, pp. 148-149)
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The tool that he has provided is a method
called Umwelt Reconstruction; it is a form of
participant observation, different from that
known to qualitative inquirers, but one that
also makes the observer visible. It is an
attempt to make it possible for human beings
to understand the experience of other species
by first corning to understand the lived
experience of the observer (a human being)
and subtracting out that which they do not
share.
Biologists Maturana and Varela (1987)
consider the trick of overcoming the
dichotomy to be one of walking a middle
route, treading, in their terms, the razor's
edge:

trichotomy possible within this theory is :
relations within a unity; relations between a
unity and its environment; and the observer.
This trichotomy is organized differently than
Deely's but still conforms to semiotic
criteria. 5
Another way of expressing what has
been discussed in this section is to suggest
that the universe is made up of possibility.
This possibility is the raw material from
which a multitude of realities are built. It is
the job of the inquirer to investigate the
processes and outcomes of these constructions.
Deely ( 1990) describes the semiotic
point of view this way:

The situation is actually simple. As
observers we can see a unity in different
domains, depending on the distinctions
we make. Thus, on the one hand, we can
consider a system in that domain where
its components operate, in the domain of
its internal states and its structural
changes. Thus considered, for the
internal dynamics of the system, the
environment does not exist; it is irrelevant. On the other hand, we can consider
a unity that also interacts with its
environment and describes its history of
interactions with it. From this perspective in which the observer can establish
relations between certain features of the
environment and the behavior of the
unity, the internal dynamics of that unity
are irrelevant. (p. 133)

The semiotic point of view is the
perspective that results from the sustained attempt to live reflectively with
and follow out the consequences of one
simple realization: the whole of our
experience, from its most primitive
origins in sensation to its most refined
achievements of understanding, is a
network or web of sign relations. (p. 13)

So, representationalism and solipsism are
components of a broader context in which an
observer describes either relations between a
unity as a whole and its environment or
relations within a unity, the domain in which
its components operate. What must be kept
in mind at all times is the pivotal role of a
mind or knower, an observer. 4 Maturana and
Varela remind us that anything that is said is
said by someone. For something to be
known, it must be known by someone. A

Objectivity and Subjectivity

Objectivity and subjectivity are particularly value laden terms. Paradigmatic
change has brought with it a certain amount
of dispute about how the terms should be
used. The use of the term objective seems an
especially sensitive issue. I was intrigued by
an argument between Phillips (1990) and
4.

5.

The term observer is meant to indicate an
aspect of the human species that arises with
language.
Imposing triadic relations on the theories of
Uexktill and Maturana & Varela is an act of
interpretation. Both sets of researchers consider their works to be cyclical in nature. In
comparing his father's cyclic model to
Peirce's triadic model T. von Uexktill (1987)
says the difference is that the former is
dynamic and the latter synchronic.

Teaching & Learning: The Journal of Natural Inquiry and Reflective Practice

Jeanette Bopry

11

Guba (1990) about whether the term needed
to be defined at all that culminated in Phillips
saying that "no one at the present conference
on qualitative inquiry in education, no matter
what his or her personal epistemological
position may be, is ignorant of the dictionary
definition of objectivity or objective" (p. 92).
Phillips was suggesting that there was one
definition of the term and it was obvious.
This led me to wonder what the dictionary
definition was. I consulted the unabridged
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986, pp. 1555-1556, 2275-2276)
and found that even within definition one,
which most closely deals with uses of the
term that would interest an inquirer, a
number of epistemological positions are
covered. Indeed some uses of the term seem
diametrically opposed to others. The reader
is invited to check Webster's themselves to
inspect the variety of options at his/her
disposal.
Perhaps the most pervasive effect that
the use of the terms objective and subjective
have had on inquiry is their use as a standard
against which inquiry is judged. Within an
epistemology that considers knower and
known as independent of each other
objectivity has come to be associated with
good research, particularly as it relates to the
control of and hopefully the elimination of
bias, the exclusion of the observer, and the
conduct of " value-free" research. Objectivity
can be ensured provided procedures are
carefully adhered to. According to Phillips
(1990), "objective seems to be a label that we
apply to inqumes that meet certain
procedural standards, but objectivity does
not guarantee that the results of inquiries
have any certainty" (p. 23). This is similar to
Lincoln and Guba's (1985) use of the term
"trustworthiness." Trustworthiness includes
credibility, transferability, 6 dependability,
and
confirmability.
Confirmability
is
specifically intended to replace objectivity

and is demonstrated by a procedure called
auditing 7 (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
According to Phillips (1990) the good/
bad connotation is fundamental. Subjectivity
is considered bias. However, bias is only one
of many ways the dictionary defines
subjectivity. Rorty ( 1979) says that one of
the primary reasons for confusion has been
the tendency to conflate two senses of
objective, to "represent things as they really
are and as characterizing a view that is
mutually agreed upon." This could leave the
term "subjective" to mean
roughly
something that is not agreed upon and
therefore wrong .
Shifting paradigms in the field of inquiry
have brought about differing responses to the
use of the terms objective and subjective.
One response has been to attempt to apply
them to all forms of inquiry as Phillips
(1990) does. Subjectivity has often been
associated with poor quality research, with
biased and value-laden research, and with
"unscientific" research. It follows that
subjectivity would constitute a sign of an
inadequate epistemology. Rorty ( 1979) has a
pragmatic, if not cynical, way of interpreting
this way of defining these terms. What is
objective is what is agreed upon by a group,
what is subjective is what that group finds
irrelevant. This is a political position, one
that is tied to Sartre's concept of avoiding
personal responsibility, and will be discussed
further in a section on ethics. Certainly Rorty
has a good point in that all inquirers are
interested in reaching consensus, whether
they call it objectivity or something else.
Consensus is probably the best that can be
hoped for under any circumstances.
Another response is to reject the
positive/negative connotation while more or
less accepting the terms and using them as a
way of contrasting the new with the old. This
was the route selected by Lincoln and Guba,
7.

6.

Guba no longer considers transferability
important to trustworthiness .

Other procedures associated with trustworthiness include prolonged engagement, triangulation, and member checks.
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in early wntmgs on naturalistic inquiry.
Within this framework, objectivity is not
redefined; it is simply considered irrelevant.
Irrelevant because the possibility of its very
existence is ~uestioned. Instead, subjectivity
is celebrated. Here subjectivity is Kantian,
defined as "of, relating to, or determined by
the mind, ego, or consciousness as the
subject of experience and knowledge
(subjective reality)" (Webster's, p. 2275).
This definition of subjectivity does not
concede the negative connotations suggested
by Phillips; subjectivity is not equated with
bias. Rather the diverse ways that reality can
be constructed are celebrated. Within this
tradition, for example, Peshkin (1988)
considers the ultimate goal of research to be
better self-understanding.
Yet another response is that taken by
Paulo Freire ( 1970) who uses the terms in a
grammatical sense. A subject is an actor and
an object is something acted upon (see
Webster's, pp. 1555 & 2275). Freire's
epistemology is patently political. It is aimed
at problem solving by empowering and
giving voice to those oppressed or victimized
by a dominant culture. The outcome of such
research is often predetermined; what is in
question is how the outcome can be
achieved. Subjectivity is a positive force in
such action-oriented research. Objectivity
would deal with questions of what aspects of
the reality in question need to be changed
and how to go about effecting such change.
Of particular interest to us in the context
of this discussion of semiotics is a usage
recommended by a prominent semiotician.
John Deely (1990) redefines objectivity and,
to a lesser extent, subjectivity, and he does so
in a way that eliminates any connotation of
good and bad. Deely defines objectivity as
that which is known, and more particularly,
publicly known. Webster also provides
definitions consistent with this position.
Subjectivity is defined as "of or belonging to

8.

See Roman & Apple (1990).

the real or essential being of that which
supports qualities, attributions, or relations:
substantial, real---compare with objective"
(see Webster's, p. 2275). Objective is defined
as "existing only in relation to the mind:
relating to the thing considered merely in
relation to the knowing subject" and as
"publicly or intersubjectively observable or
verifiable, independent of what is personal or
private in our apprehensions and feelings, of
such nature that rational minds agree in
holding it real or true or valid" (see
Webster' s, pp. 1555-1556). According to
Deely, being known is a matter of degree,
some things are only known and as such they
are more objective than things that have
actual existence and are also known. That
which has existence separate from being
known is subjective. Those aspects of individuals that are known only to themselves
are also subjective. So, for example: Hamlet
is only known and is therefore a more
objective being than Hitler who also existed.
Central to semiotics is the creation of the
nonexistent through signs. This ability to use
signs to signify that which does not exist
makes language possible, makes Hamlet and
unicorns possible. The difference, then,
between an objective and a subjective entity
is that the objective entity may not exist at
all. In fact, the most objective entity is one
that does not exist, just as the most subjective
entity is one that exists but that no one has
knowledge of.

Discussion
Using the term objective to mean to
separate oneself from what one is observing
or judging presupposes a realist, objectivist
epistemology and begs the question why
inquirers that believe in multiple constructed
realities would concede this definition. Why
should a discredited point of view define the
terms of other points of view? While the
term objective has been shown to have a
wide range of epistemological meanings and
while qualitative inquirers do not universally
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assume one definition of objectivity or of
subjectivity, there does seem to be a common
use of the terms within the vernacular that is
consistent with a realist epistemology.
Simply ignoring or considering irrelevant the
common use of a term does nothing to
change or broaden the use of that term.
Objectivity as defined by a realist epistemology may not exist within a constructivist
epistemology; but, part of making that
alternative epistemology acceptable is gaining general acceptance of its terminology. As
Jong as the common use of the terms is at
odds with the concepts of an epistemological
position, that position is at a disadvantage.
Alternative forms of inquiry need to coopt terminology in a way that is consistent
with its own epistemology. I suggest that this
is not so difficult. The term objective can be
taken back, as Freire (1970) has done, to
mean related to the object (what is acted
upon) or to mean, as Deely (1990) asserts
was an antecedent usage, "that which is
known." Both understand the power in the
definition of terms. Deely's definitions are
most interesting because they nearly
transpose the common use of the two terms
"objective" and "subjective." That which is
known includes things that exist and things
that do not exist, while what is subjective
exists but is unknown. He argues that semiotics is essentially cenoscopic in nature so it
is proper to assume that this fundamental
recategorization depends upon group consensus. To be known, then, is to be shared.
This suggests terminology that does not
include the connotation (the bias, if you will)
that objective is good, subjective is bad. Both
Deely's definition and Freire's definition are
compatible with an epistemology that
assumes multiple realities. Neither definition
denies the viability of quantitative inquiry
the way that the positivist usage of the terms
denies the viability of qualitative inquiry. To
paraphrase Deely (1990) the problem with
logical positivism is in the sign systems or
methods it denies, rather than in the method
it espouses. Both Freire and Deely would

agree that the pos1tiv1st usage reinforces a
power structure that denies the viability of
perspectives other than its own.

Method
Deely (1990) goes to a lot of trouble to
make a distinction between what he calls a
point of view and what he calls a method. A
method is a way of implementing a point of
view or some aspect of a point of view.
Semiotics, like logical positivism or
behaviorism, is a point of view rather
than a method. But, at the same time, unlike positivism or behaviorism, semiotics
in its doctrinal foundation is not an
ideological standpoint that can be
disguised as a method of inquiry while
in reality closing inquiry down. (p. 12)
Further, any viewpoint that can be implemented by a single method is suspect:
But a point of view that can be fully
implemented by a single method would
be, on the whole, a very narrow viewpoint. The richer a point of view, the
more diverse are the methods needed to
exploit the possibilities for understanding latent within it. (p. 9)
Semiotics does not associate itself with a
single method. Deely (1990) writes that
semiotics has given rise to a variety of
methods. He goes on to say that semiotics
should not be associated with one method
but should "establish its theoretical
framework with sufficient richness and
flexibility to accommodate itself to the full
range of signifying phenomena" (1990, p. 9).
In this section, I will describe some
possibilities a semiotic perspective suggests:
First, Peirce (1986) postulates three
forms of logic which are also three stages of
inquiry: deduction, induction, and abduction.9 All are derived from the syllogism
known as Barbara. 10 Deduction and induc-
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tion are not capable of generating new
knowledge. It is left to the third of the
syllogistic triad to perform this service.
Abduction is, quite simply, educated
guessing or hypothesis creation. Abductive
reasoning moves from the result to the rule to
the case. There is a great deal of room for
error as can be seen in the following
example:
Result: John is mortal
Rule: All men are mortal
Case: John is a man
John, of course, could be one of a number of
other mortal beings. Abduction works in the
following way: A surprising fact is observed;
one can postulate a condition under which, if
true, the surprising fact would be a matter of
course (CPS .189). There is, then, reason to
suspect that the condition is true. Deduction
is used to develop and clarify the hypothesis,
induction to test it, but it is by abduction that
hypotheses are generated. Of the three,
abduction is most closely associated with
forms of qualitative research (Shank, 1987).
Second, Maturana and Varela ( 1987)
describe four conditions essential to proposing a scientific explanation:
1. Describing the phenomenon (or
phenomena) to be explained in a way
acceptable to a body of observers.
2. Proposing a conceptual system capable
of generating the phenomenon to be
explained in a way acceptable to a body
of observers (explanatory hypothesis).

Peirce used the terms hypothesis and retroduction before settling on abduction. See
Peirce (1929) for a discussion of the concept
of abduction.
10. Barbara: If a=b and b=c, then a=c. Barbara is
a deduction; induction and abduction result
from transformations in the form of deduction (rule, case, result). Induction = case,
result, rule. Abduction = result, rule, case.

9.

3.

4.

Obtaining from (b) other phenomena not
explicitly considered in that proposition,
as also describing its conditions for
observation by a body of observers.
Observing these other phenomena
obtained from (b). (p. 28)

This method involves observation, hypothesis generation, consensus building, and
observation. Maturana and Varela make it
clear that observations belong to the
observer, not to the phenomenon being
observed.
Third, Jacob van UexkUll's method is
called Umwelt Research and is described in
some depth by his son, Thure. Umwelt
research is empirical, and relies upon
observation and experimentation:
The approach of Umwelt-research,
which aims to reconstruct creative
nature's "process of creating," can be
described as "participatory observation,"
if the
terms
participation
and
observation are defined more clearly:
Observation means first of all ascertaining which of those signs registered
by the observer in his own experiential
world are also received by the living
being under observation. This requires a
careful analysis of the sensory organs
(receptors) of the organism in question.
After this is accomplished, it is possible
to observe how the organism proceeds to
decode the signs it has received. Participation, therefore, signifies the reconstruction of the Umwelt (surroundingworld) of another organism, or-after
having ascertained the signs which the
organism can receive as well as the
codes it uses to interpret them-the
sharing of the decoding processes which
occur during its behavioral activities.
The objective of Umwelt research is to
develop a theory of nature's composition, or to reconstruct the score to the
"symphony of meanings" that nature
composes out of the innumerable
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surrounding-worlds (Umwelten) and
plays, as it were, on a gigantic keyboard,
of which our life and our surroundingworld is but one key. (T. van Uexklill,
1987, p. 149)
Sless (1986) says that semioticians have
been blinded to "real" semiotic research,
which is the creation of new languages and
the change and development of existing
languages. Deely (1990, p. 23) supports the
potential for this type of research when he
argues that "symbols do not just exist; they
also grow." Eco (1979) also describes the
dynamic nature of signs when he talks about
the infinite regression of signs. Any
interpretation can become the object of
further study and interpretation.
If
semiosis
is
the
irreducible
commonality, the stand-for relation, then
reality is a construction and the object of
inquiry is shifted from discovering what is
real to revealing the multitude of ways of
constructing reality. This suggests a place for
consideration of action-oriented research of
the type suggested by Freire (1979). This
type of research normally has a particular
outcome as a goal. The inquiry or research
comes in the form of finding a viable route
from where one is to where one wants to go.
It certainly falls outside the realm of what
realists might call objective inquiry, as do the
other methods described in this section.

Ethical Considerations
The open nature of semiotics may leave
one thinking that it is devoid of any ethical
position. Indeed, sermot1cs provides a
framework within which any method that
reveals sign activity would be welcome. As
Deely ( 1990) admits, "even bad methods
truly reveal" (p. 12). However, if we consider
that the sign is indifferent to the physical
existence of that which it represents, then
certain ethical considerations follow. The
existence of the interpretant makes uncertainty a built-in characteristic of sign activity.

Maturana and Varela begin The Tree of
Knowledge with an admonition against what
they call the sin of certainty. Certainty has
some important consequences. One is an
ideological intolerance not unlike religious
intolerance. Deely (1990) talks about the
danger of points of view that parade as
methods because their assumption of a
privileged position has the effect of shutting
inquiry down. These are ideological points of
view that use method in such a way as to
constrain inquiry to the limits of that
ideology. Those holding positions outside
these boundaries are heretical, unscientific,
or irrelevant.
Another consequence is that the
assumption of a privileged position has the
effect of investing power in a select group of
inquirers. Once an ideology is accepted as
truth, those in power are there as a natural
result of their superior understanding. They
have not created knowledge, they reveal it to
the rest of us. It is they who are in a position
to decide whose positions fall within the
desired boundaries and it is they who decide
what those boundaries are at any given point
in time and whose alterations of those
boundaries are acceptable.
All that is required for these and other
consequences to follow is the acceptance of
the epistemological position that knower and
known are separable. Once one has separated
the knower from the known there is no need
for the community of inquirers or their
audience to accept responsibility for the state
of the world. There is no need to accept that
one's position of power may have come
about as a result of the oppression of another
or that one's position of subservience is any
more than fate or the natural order of things.
There is no need to believe that things could
change even if change was desirable. This
consequence is the avoidance of personal
responsibility. Rorty (1979) describes it in
the spirit of Sartre:
If we could convert knowledge from
something
discursive,
something
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attained by continual adjustments of
ideas or words, into something as
ineluctable as being shoved about, or
being transfixed by a sight which leaves
us speechless, then we should no longer
have the responsibility for choice among
competing ideas and words, theories and
vocabularies. This attempt to slough off
responsibility is what Sartre describes as
the attempt to tum oneself into a thinginto an etre-en-soi. (pp. 375-376)
The avoidance of personal responsibility
plays into the investment of power. For those
in positions of power, avoiding personal
responsibility is a licence to shore up one's
power at the expense of others without
feeling guilty about it. Another's subordinate
position is a result of their own inadequacy
rather than the consequence of one's own
greed. For the oppressed, who collude in
their own oppression (Freire, 1970) through
the fatalism referred to above, there is no
possibility of change and therefore no reason
to expend precious energy on an attempt to
effect change. A semiotic point of view does
not countenance certainty or its consequences. It is one thing for an individual to
determine what is acceptable practice for
oneself, quite another for an individual or
group to make that decision for all inquirers.
Within a semiotic point of view there is no
avoiding personal responsibility for one's
own reality.
Semiotics, however, does not speak to
ethics where the metaphoric rubber meets
the road. If even bad methods reveal, specific
methods cannot be disqualified on ethical
grounds that emanate from semiotics itself.
The contribution that semiotics makes is in
its potential for analyzing methods and
making visible which sign processes are
revealed and which are suppressed.
Decisions about the ethical status of a given
method are left to the standards of the
community. Deely never disputes that
individuals are ideological and that the
methods they use will reflect their ideology.

What is unacceptable from a semJotlc
standpoint is the assumption of a privileged
position. No one ideology may be privileged
over another. What semiotics does is make
individual inquirers and their ideologies
visible to their peers in such a way that
appropriate criticism can be made within the
community of investigators.
This in no way suggests that anything
goes in terms of method. The community of
inquirers and society as a whole must take
responsibility for such constraints on inquiry.
Semiotics provides a framework that is
inclusive rather than exclusive in its thrust
and thus provides an opposing tension to
ideological constraints on method. Such
tension would not preclude ideological
constraints being applied to inquiry when
there is general social consensus (as, for
example, with the violation of human rights),
but would make ideological constraints more
difficult to justify. Semiotics can only be
employed to reveal what a method conceals
as well as what it illuminates (Deely, 1990);
it does not specify constraints on method.
Conclusion

What does semiotics have to offer
inquirers? More specifically what does it
offer those of us interested in alternative
approaches to inquiry?
Most importantly, it provides a warrant
for the exploration of a variety of methods of
inquiry. Methods may be as various as there
are forms of understanding. The value of
each method is determined by the entire
community of inquirers and society at large
rather than by the proponents of a single
privileged position. Semiotics allows
methods to seek their own niche within a
structure that promotes the investigation and
construction of multiple realities.
In addition, it offers a single, nonideological framework that facilitates
communication between proponents of
different methods. In doing so it offers a less
judgmental terminology that may be used
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across methods. In the process it makes what
a method discloses and conceals visible. For
example, while abduction, a concept that is
relevant in all the papers in this special issue,
is implicit in all forms of inquiry, it is made
explicit in semiotic inquiry. Any method that
fully represents a point of view would be
considered suspect.
To be consistent with the values of
semiotics, inquirers would have to be explicit
about the method of questioning and the
effect that such questioning has on our model
of nature. In other words, it would make the
author of inquiry visible to the reader. If
taken seriously, the profile of alternative
forms of inquiry should be raised in relation
to traditional forms .
Semiotics may very well be the allinclusive paradigm that Deely (1990, p. 17)
believes will "mediate a change of
intellectual epoch and culture as profound
and total as was the separating of medieval
from ancient Greek times, or the separating
of modern times from the medieval Latin
era."
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